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Bell Atlantic v. Twombly:
How Motions to Dismiss Become
(Disguised) Summary Judgments†
Richard A. Epstein∗
Abstract
The recent Supreme Court decision in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly stands at the crossroads
of antitrust and civil procedure. As an antitrust case, Twombly makes sense on structural grounds.
The FCC regulation of the telecommunications industry, and the many innocent explanations as
to why each telecommunications company would stay out of its rival’s territories obviated the
need for further discovery. But in many other contexts, including Conley v. Gibson—a case
involving potential breach of the duty of fair representation on matters of racial discrimination—
discovery could flesh out the relevant factual issues. The Supreme Court’s general disapproval of
Conley sweeps far too wide. Discovery should only be denied when the plausible inferences that
can be drawn from the complaint and publicly available evidence clearly imply further discovery
is of little value. Accordingly, the Federal Rules of Civil procedure should explicitly
acknowledge that in a small set of cases motions on the pleadings can properly function as
truncated and disguised motions for summary judgment.

The present Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow a plaintiff’s case to be attacked either for
its legal or factual sufficiency. The rules governing the former are in general adequate because
judgments on the validity of claims do not require any discovery. Decisions before trial on factual
matters are much more complex, especially in antitrust cases where discovery before a summary
judgment motion can be highly expensive on open-ended claims of collusion over prices or
territories. To counteract that risk, all courts today allow some judgments to be entered at the
close of pleading and before discovery. The recent Supreme Court decision in Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly,1 reversing the Second Circuit decision in Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp.,2 resolved
the ongoing dispute by requiring that a complaint contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief
† This paper was prepared from a speech given at Washington University in St. Louis School of Law as part of the 2006–2007
Public Interest Law Speakers Series
∗ James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, The University of Chicago; Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior
Fellow, The Hoover Institution. . I would like to thank my colleagues at the University of Chicago work in progress for their helpful
comments on earlier drafts of the paper. I would also like to thank Brad Grossman, University of Chicago Law School, Class of 2007
and Ramtin Terheri, University of Chicago Law School, Class of 2009 for their excellent research assistance. An early version of this
Article, written before the Supreme Court’s decided Bell Atlantic v. Twombly was published by the AEI Brookings Joint Center. See
AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, Epstein, Motions to Dismiss Antitrust Cases: Separating Fact from Fantasy,
Related Publication 06–08, pp. 3–4 (2006). It contained a detailed analysis of the decisions by Judge Sack in the Second Circuit and
Judge Lynch in the District Court. I have left much of that material in this Article because it sets the stage for what happened in the
United States Supreme Court. Although I have worked as a consultant for Verizon on previous occasions, I have written this article
without any assistance or financial support from it or any other defendant involved in this litigation.
1. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly (Twombly III), 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007), rev’g Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp. (Twombly II),
425 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2005), rev’g Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp. (Twombly I), 313 F. Supp. 2d 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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that is plausible on its face.” While the result of the decision is to be welcome, its analysis is
flawed. In reality, Twombly III was a disguised motion for summary judgment that is best
defended as properly balancing the relative error costs of stopping too soon or going too far. A
close look at the record suggests that discovery would supply no new information of value, no
matter how the case was pleaded. Therefore, the proper principle is that courts should be more
willing to enter final judgments at the close of the pleadings, especially against plaintiffs whose
claims are based solely on easily accessible public information which already have been rebutted
by the same kinds of public evidence.
I. INTRODUCTION: LEGAL AND FACTUAL UNCERTAINTY UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted in 1938 with great fanfare. Their
introduction was celebrated as an obvious advance over the earlier rules of procedure that were
embodied in the standard codes.3 Key to that system were new rules that governed pleading and
discovery prior to trial. These rules were drafted with reference to the litigation most common at
the time, such as actions on promissory notes, negligence suits for traffic-intersection collisions,
actions actions for money had and received and patent infringement cases.4 All of these are set
out with model complaints that take a sentence or two to set out, and turn on one or two key facts:
was the money owed, did the defendant run the traffic light, and so on. Like every procedural
system, the modern rules of civil procedure had to make room for three sorts of attacks on the
pleadings contained in a plaintiff’s complaint: the defendant had to be able to claim that the
complaint did not state a cause of action on which relief could be granted; the defendant had to be
able to deny the factual charges that were made; and the defendant had to be able to introduce
new matter that would either justify or excuse the allegations in question.5
All three of these issues could arise in the full range of litigation. In automobile cases, the
defendant could move to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action if the plaintiff does not
allege negligence. Or the defendant could move to dismiss on summary judgment by proving that
his car was not involved in the collision.6 Or the defendant could introduce an affirmative defense
such as contributory negligence to bar or diminish the plaintiff’s claim. In dealing with these
issues, the basic position was that all the legal questions going to the sufficiency of the complaint
could be decided on a motion on the pleadings before discovery, but that motions to defeat the
2. Twombly II, 425 F.3d 99.
3. For a brief account and praise of the “liberal” elements of the Federal Rules, see, e.g., Fleming James, Jr., Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Jr. & John Leubsdorf, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1.7 (4th ed. 1992). For the liberal rules on pleading, see id. §§ 3.1, 3.6.
4. See FED. R. CIV. P. Forms 3 through 18.
5. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b), 8(c) (establishing standards for denials and affirmative defenses).
6. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56. Such motions are of course commonplace. See, e.g., Illinois Central R. Co. v. Dupont, 326 F.3d 665
(5th Cir. 2003) (granting summary judgment in favor of insurance company on grounds that the insurance policy only covered
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claim on factual issues could be made only by a motion for summary judgment after discovery
had been conducted, usually in a relatively compact time frame, given the nature of the
underlying dispute.
There is little doubt that for much of its history, the Supreme Court has taken a position that is
consistent with the view of notice pleading that animated the drafting of the Federal Rules. The
most important landmark along the way is Conley v. Gibson,7 a staple among civil procedure
cases, which contains the oft-quoted injunction “a complaint should not be dismissed for failure
to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”8 The primary reason for this liberal rule of
pleading was partly dependent on the specific context of the case in Conley. The plaintiffs in
Conley were a group of black railroad workers who had complained of racial discrimination at the
hands of their union, such that in 1955 the Court had strong motivation to allow the case to run its
course. But it should not be supposed from this broad statement of the rule that the complaint
itself was drafted in some inarticulate fashion, or that the rule announced in Conley had in fact
received relentless criticism in the fifty plus years since its adoption. The Supreme Court in
Twombly III held that the phrase “no set of facts” has been “questioned, criticized, and explained
away long enough.”9 But on this matter Justice Stevens’s dissent surely has the better argument.
Conley has long been treated as an authoritative statement of the law that has been followed
uniformly in the Supreme Court and elsewhere,10 and the plaintiffs’ allegations are quite in the
spirit of the Federal Rules. The Conley complaint is fact-free but gives notice of the basic
elements of the claim.11
Twombly III can not be defended if the only question is whether it captures the sense of notice
pleading in earlier cases. Nonetheless, as a matter of principle, I think that the judgment is right
for reasons that were not voiced in Justice Souter’s majority opinion, but which put the case on a
company truck, not employee’s personal vehicle).
7. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
8. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957).
9. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly (Twombly III), 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1969 (2007).
10. Id. at 1978 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
11. Conley, 355 U.S. at 43. The court described Plaintiff’s complaint as follows:
Petitioners were employees of the Texas and New Orleans Railroad at its Houston Freight House. Local 28 of the
Brotherhood was the designated bargaining agents under the Railway Labor Act for the bargaining unit to which petitioners
belonged. A contract existed between the Union and the Railroad which gave the employees in the bargaining unit certain
protection from discharge and loss of seniority. In May 1954, the Railroad purported to abolish 45 jobs held by petitioners or
other Negroes all of whom were either discharged or demoted. In truth the 45 jobs were not abolished at all but instead filled
by whites as the Negroes were ousted, except for a few instances where Negroes were rehired to fill their old jobs but with
loss of seniority. Despite repeated pleas by petitioners, the Union, acting according to plan, did nothing to protect them
against these discriminatory discharges and refused to give them protection comparable to that given white employees. The
complaint then went on to allege that the Union had failed in general to represent Negro employees equally and in good faith.
It charged that such discrimination constituted a violation of petitioners’ right under the Railway Labor Act to fair
representation from their bargaining agent. And it concluded by asking for relief in the nature of declaratory judgment,
injunction and damages.
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firmer ground, and give a far clearer indication of why the case came out how it did and how far
its scope will extend. As matters now stand, it looks as though the decision has made a general
transformation in pleading rules in all cases, not just within the antitrust area, although only the
future will show for sure. There is no reason to confine the logic of the decision to antitrust
cases—which makes it all the more critical that the Supreme Court adopt the proper rationale on
the question.12 The nub of the difficulty is that the notice pleading regime of 1938 performs
erratically in the context of modern complex litigation.13
The fact/law distinction that organizes civil procedure does not work as well in the context of
modern litigation as it does in the simpler cases that originally animated the Federal Rules.
Looking at the antitrust laws under the Sherman Act, for example, there is a genuine difference of
opinion as to whether certain types of behaviors are allowed.14 These cases ask such questions as
whether it is unlawful for firms to lower prices below their marginal costs of production, to tie the
sale of one good to the sale of another, or to impose territorial restrictions on their retailers.15
These issues are typically decided on motions to dismiss the complaint, or on motions to strike
particular kinds of affirmative defenses from the responsive pleadings. The factual issues are
usually stipulated because the challenged practices or contractual provisions are all public
knowledge. Once the legal issues of principle are resolved one way or another, then a judgment
on liability will usually follow. The concept of dismissal for failure to state a cause of action has
little relevance in modern Section One Sherman Act cases dealing with price fixing or territorial
division; every plaintiff knows how to draft a complaint that says that the named defendants
Id.
12. This includes suits brought against government officials for various constitutional violations, or suits brought against private
defendants for violations of, for example, antidiscrimination laws, which turn on complex evidence of party motive on the one hand
and industry structure on the other. On the latter, see the earlier Supreme Court decision in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S.
506 (2002).
13. In this Article, I will concentrate on antitrust cases, but the arguments made here apply to other forms of litigation.
14. The two sections read:
Sec. 1. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or
engage in any such combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on
conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $100,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person,
$1,000,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding ten years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
Sec. 2. Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person, or
persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed
guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $100,000 if a corporation, or if any
other person, $1,000,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding ten years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the
court.
15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
15. In this recent term, for example, the Supreme Court in Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705
(2007) rejected the earlier decision in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911), which held that
minimum price restraints that manufacturers impose on retailers should be a per se violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. For my
skeptical views on using antitrust liability against dominant firms in vertical situations, see Richard A. Epstein, Monopoly Dominance
or Level Playing Field? The New Antitrust Paradox, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 49 (2005); see also California Dental Ass’n v FTC, 526 U.S.
756, 771–75 (1999); LePage’s Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141 (3d. Cir. 2003).
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agreed to collude with each other in setting prices or dividing markets within specified
geographical and temporal limits.16
It is commonplace within the antitrust law to note that horizontal price-fixing and territorial
divisions are subject to a per se rule of liability—or, more accurately, often require very specific
justifications before they may be held legal. In most litigated cases, these justifications are far
from the scene, so the only question is whether the events in question have occurred. The hard
legal question concerns what types of rules should be used to decide whether these claims of
price-fixing or territorial division should progress to the next stage.
As a matter of first principle, that question involves some estimation of whether the strength
of the plaintiff’s case is strong enough at each decision point to warrant a further investment of
social resources, and a further strain on the defendant’s resources in dealing with these matters.
My basic thesis is that the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are not well suited to the
complexities of modern litigation, especially in antitrust law, and arguably in other areas as well.
Although courts have recognized the need to make some limited review of the factual
underpinnings of a case, they have not attempted to make any systematic cost benefit analysis of
going forward with litigation through discovery. In general, as the costs of discovery mount, the
case for terminating litigation earlier in the cycle gets ever stronger, and should be realized,
especially in those cases where the plaintiff relies on public information, easily assembled and
widely available, that can be effectively rebutted by other public evidence.
The stakes are enormous in antitrust cases where the underlying wrongs are often confused
with perfectly legal conduct. It is accepted on all sides that simple parallel conduct among
defendant firms in the same industry is not, without more, evidence of any form of collusion,
because such behavior is what is expected in all markets, regardless of structure. Quite simply,
the unilateral actions of buyers searching for the lowest price will bring prices into equilibrium
regardless of collusion or market structure, so that identity of price is consistent with both
monopoly and competition, and hence not evidence of the former.17 It is vital not to draw
negative inferences from mere parallel behavior in an antitrust context. Any such legal rule would
impose direct costs on business firms as management fights the major distractions of litigation,
16. In this paper, I shall not discuss any cases that raise these substantive questions. Instead I shall turn my attention to the
contexts of price-fixing and territorial division in which there is no dispute over the legality of certain types of practice, but genuine
uncertainty as to whether these actions have taken place at all.
17.
The inadequacy of showing parallel conduct or interdependence, without more, mirrors the ambiguity of the behavior:
consistent with conspiracy, but just as much in line with a wide swath of rational and competitive business strategy
unilaterally prompted by common perceptions of the market. See, e.g., AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies,
Epstein, Motions to Dismiss Antitrust Cases: Separating Fact from Fantasy, Related Publication 06-08, pp. 3–4 (2006)
(discussing problem of “false positives” in § 1 suits).
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly (Twombly III), 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007). And so this Article, from an earlier incarnation,
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and impose dead-weight costs on the economy by soaking up resources in rent-seeking litigation.
More significantly, entry, pricing, marketing and other business decisions would be colored by a
non-dismissal rule that opens all American businesses to unsubstantiated allegations of
conspiracy to restrain trade. Parallel behavior is part of the dynamic competitive market
processes. It is far more likely to be the consequence of sound unilateral business judgments than
any supposed conspiracy. The prospect that the pro-competitive actions of competitors could
support class-action treble damage antitrust litigation in many contexts would discourage sellers
from responding to market signals.18 In any dynamic market, we want firms to mimic the rational
conduct of rivals, which they are less likely to do if they fear endless vistas of antitrust liability.
Yet those very risks and more emerge when the Federal Rules allow a fundamental lack of
significant, coherent evidence to override what all parties in antitrust cases concede to be the
valid rule: mere parallel conduct in no way raises any antitrust implications.19
In dealing with this problem of proof, the law will only be able to achieve its appropriate ends
if it develops reliable and efficient evidentiary rules and standards to distinguish between
competitive and anticompetitive behaviors. In setting out these rules, it is necessary to remain
cognizant of the brute reality that the legal system must always deal with two kinds of error. The
first type, aptly named false positive, wrongly brands firms that are in fact in competition with
each other as collusive. The second type allows firms that engage in collusive practices to escape
detection. In any sensible view, both types of errors matter, and the Federal Rules must take great
care in finding the best way to discriminate between the two types of market practices.
In making these calculations, however, it is incorrect to assign equal weight to the two kinds
of error. Efforts of collusion are often unstable, and are frequently susceptible to correction by
new entry. This disintegration happens when firms in a cartel cheat by establishing a collusive
price, or when new firms enter the market under an umbrella created by the high cartel prices. In
contrast, competitive practices that are wrongly condemned as collusive are not subject to the
same measure of self-correction. If subjected to an antitrust ordeal, these firms—even if they
prevail after expensive litigation—are punished for doing exactly what the law wants to
encourage. No amount of private entry, moreover, will be able to mitigate the damages that the
legal system can cause by allowing litigation to disrupt the operation of a competitive market.
Accordingly, there is very good reason to be careful of any lax system of pleading or proof that
invites a high rate of false positives.
becomes an authority for itself.
18. This concern was voiced by the Supreme Court in Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., Inc., 127 S.
Ct. 1069, 1075 (2007), as well.
19. Twombly III, 127 S. Ct. at 1964.
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Unfortunately, the basic thrust of the Federal Rules is against this point of view because it
requires only “very spare” allegations to meet the pleading burdens.20 The nub of the problem
stems from needing to decide what must be established at each stage of a case in order to warrant
its dismissal with prejudice—a decision that the original Federal Rules made with respect to the
limited menu of cases that was foremost in the minds of the drafters. In approaching this
structural question with a fresh eye, it is essential to examine the roles of two key provisions of
the Federal Rules. One key provision is Rule 8(a), which provides simply that the “[g]eneral
[r]ules of [p]leading” require “(2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.”21 Note that this rule, as drafted, is intended to set up an inquiry of the
legal sufficiency of the complaint, not its factual adequacy. Indeed, the articulation of the rule
does not even use the word “facts” or mention anything about the specificity of the facts so
required. Rule 8(e)(1) adds to the mix by stating that “[e]ach averment of a pleading shall be
simple, concise, and direct.”22 Once again there is no requirement for any degree of factual
precision as to time, place, persons or events. There is only one provision in the Federal Rules—
Rule 9(b), dealing with fraud, mistake and condition of the mind—which requires a plaintiff to
state the circumstances of the allegation with particularity.23 Why specificity is expressly required
in this case, and no other, is never made clear. The probable negative inference from this
proposition is that cases involving none of the above, including all complex antitrust litigation, do
not require that specificity.
The argument in support of the basic outlook in the federal rules is that the pleadings serve
only to give “fair notice”24 to the defendant that certain charges are against it so that it can prepare
for trial. The bulk of the action lies in discovery and pretrial motions.25 The common view is that
the specifics should come out in an open-ended discovery process that allows both interrogatories
and depositions, which may be directed toward “any matter”26 relevant to the case. Note that the
relevant information, broadly defined, “need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”27 The scope of the
discovery is shaped therefore by the ambition of the pleadings.
At the end of the pre-trial process, the basic structure of the Federal Rules does allow for a
20. James et al., supra note 3, at 145.
21. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a).
22. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(e)(1).
23. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (“In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated
with particularity.”).
24. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957). The term “fair notice” does not actually appear in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
25. James et al., supra note 3, at 137–38; The flexibility of these procedures is stressed in Justice Stevens’s dissent, Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly (Twombly III), 127 S. Ct. at 1988; See also Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp., (Twombly II), 425 F.3d 99, 116 (2d
Cir. 2005) (Sacks, J., making the same point).
26. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
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dismissal of the case on the facts before trial under Rule 56. These motions can be made at any
time, but they result in success for the moving party only “if the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.”28 That last phrase does not refer to the sufficiency of the claim as a matter of legal
theory, but only is intended to make clear that the standard for summary judgment is such that no
reasonable jury could find against the moving party. More importantly, the motion for summary
judgment will be routinely defeated if made before the plaintiff has an opportunity to conduct
depositions and serve interrogatories upon the defendant. In the routine automobile accident, this
delay may well make sense. In the context of vast antitrust litigation, the toll from discovery in all
its forms can be great, so the pressure is clearly on to see if there is some way to obtain a final
judgment before the discovery process begins in at least some cases. The same rules of discovery
that generate one or two days worth of litigation in simple contract disputes open up just about
every record of huge national companies over years if not decades. It is therefore no accident that
Justice Souter in upholding the motion to dismiss stressed the simple but critical point that a
summary judgment motion will do nothing to curb the abuses in discovery that occurred prior to
the time that it was granted.29 The soundness of any regime that governs the relationship between
pleading and discovery is highly sensitive to matters of scale and scope. This issue is not confined
to antitrust. The same concerns have been raised in connection with suits against local
governments, where the prospect of discovery before summary judgment has also been the source
of much concern.30 I see no reason why the same concern does not arise in connection with suits
against large firms that are subject to multiple suits by huge numbers of persons that dwarf the
exposure of local governments answerable only to their own citizens. In both sets of cases the
obvious shortfall of the Federal Rules is that they are drafted in ways that wholly ignore these
considerations.
The inefficiency built into the basic design of the Federal Rules has provoked some judicial
response by courts that seek to redress this critical imbalance. The doctrinal tools available to deal
with this issue are as limited as the problem is serious. The effort to handle the problem of too
27. Id.
28. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
29. “And it is self-evident that the problem of discovery abuse cannot be solved by ‘careful scrutiny of evidence at the summary
judgment stage,’ much less ‘lucid instructions to juries,’; the threat of discovery expense will push cost-conscious defendants to settle
even anemic cases before reaching those proceedings.” Twombly III, 127 S. Ct. at 1967 (citing Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69
B.U. L. REV. 635, 638 (1989)).
30. Thus the Court in Twombly III, citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002), notes the possibility of
similar abuses in connection with cases under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Twombly III, 127 S. Ct. at 1973–74; see also Futernick
v. Sumpter Township, 78 F.3d 1051, 1058–59 (6th Cir. 1996) (dealing with possible suits for selective prosecution against local
landowners). “Determining ‘all relevant aspects’ of similar situations usually depends on too many facts (and too much discovery) to
allow dismissal on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. If we require defendants to wait until summary judgment, we burden local and state
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much discovery boils down in practice to the delicate issue of whether Rule 8, which is directed
toward securing the sufficiency of the pleadings, can be brought to bear in cases where the
challenge is to the adequacy of the underlying facts. Read literally, Rule 8 does not leave any
avenue open for a defendant to have a case dismissed on the ground that it lacks any credible
factual evidence to support it.31 In principle, therefore, it looks as though Rule 56 is the only route
for pretrial dismissal for want of proof. The great drawback of that procedure is that it allows the
plaintiff to extort a positive settlement in a worthless case, by inaugurating extensive discovery
proceedings.

II. THE CHALLENGE OF TWOMBLY III
When this critical question of dismissal procedure reached the Supreme Court, it resolved the
major tension among the lower courts that have addressed the issue. The one common thread in
those decisions is that virtually all lower courts, regardless of the disagreements among them as to
the proper standard, found wholly unappetizing the rigid division between fact and law that looks
to be built into the Federal Rules. Hence, prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Twombly III,
the formal distinction between summary judgment and motions to dismiss on the pleadings had
been eroded. Notwithstanding the liberal pleading requirements of the Federal Rules, an extensive
and confusing body of case law has developed as to when a case can be dismissed on the strength
of the record as it stands before any discovery begins.32
The Twombly case brought this matter to a head. The case is an antitrust suit that tests the
relationship between the Telecommunications Act of 199633 and the Sherman Act.34 Some
background information helps to place the matter in context. Twenty-five years ago the American
Telephone and Telegraph Company (“AT&T”) operated as a unified telephone system that
enjoyed a statutory monopoly within the United States. In consequence of litigation that the
Department of Justice brought against AT&T, a judicially ratified settlement broke AT&T into
seven local operating companies, each of which was given exclusive right to supply local phone
service within its designated territory.35 In addition, a competitive long-line industry developed
alongside, or on top of, these local phone companies, in order to complete the telephone grid.
officials with the regular prospect of ‘fishing expeditions’ and meritless suits.” Id.
31. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b) (“A party shall state in short and plain terms the party’s defenses to each claim asserted and shall
admit or deny the averments upon which the adverse party relies.”).
32. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
33. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified throughout Title 47 of the United States Code
(‘47 U.S.C.’) (2007)).
34. Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2007)).
35. United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d mem. sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001
(1983).

403-rae-twombly.doc

2007]

4/28/2008

Twombly Summary Judgment

10

This combined system was not easy to regulate, and was subject to extensive legal disputes
dealing with the scope of the initial consent decree and the various rates for interconnection
between the various elements of the system.36 In addition, Congress and the public became
progressively disenchanted with the rigid monopolies at the local exchange level, and both
desired to open up to competition.
In response to the perceived rigidities of this system, the 1996 Telecommunications Act
brought about a major restructuring of the industry which was intended to introduce competition
at the local exchange level by encouraging new Competitive Local Exchange Carriers (CLECs) to
enter into competition with the incumbent carriers (ILECs), either through interconnection, resale
or the purchase of unbundled network elements.37 The FCC was given extensive power to
implement the 1996 Act both by drafting regulations and through direct administrative
oversight.38 The 1996 Act also preserved private rights of action under the antitrust laws,39
without addressing the question of how those antitrust actions should be modified to take into
account the extensive level of oversight offered by the FCC and the state public utility
commissions.
The plaintiff class in Twombly I sought to take advantage of the antitrust laws by claiming that
the four major local exchange carriers—Bell Atlantic (now Verizon), Bell South (now being
acquired by SBC turned AT&T), Qwest Communications International, and SBC (instantly
rechristened AT&T after the merger), colluded to block competitive entry within the industry.40
The two key paragraphs in the plaintiffs’ complaint read as follows:
Beginning at least as early as February 6, 1996, and continuing to the present, the exact
dates being unknown to Plaintiffs, Defendants and their co-conspirators engaged in a
contract, combination or conspiracy to prevent competitive entry in their respective local
telephone and/or high speed internet services markets by, among other things, agreeing not
to compete with one another and to stifle attempts by others to compete with them and
otherwise allocating customers and markets to one another in violation of Section 1 of the
Sherman Act.
In the absence of any meaningful competition between the [ILECs] in one another’s
markets, and in light of the parallel course of conduct that each engaged in to prevent
competition from CLECs within their respective local telephone and/or high speed internet
services markets and the other facts and market circumstances alleged above, Plaintiffs
allege upon information and belief that [the ILECs] have entered into a contract,
36. See, e.g., United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d 460 U.S. 1001 (1983) (dealing with the original
breakup); United States v. Western Electric Co., 569 F. Supp. 1057, 1123–24 (1983) (implementing the breakup); United States v.
Western Electric Co., 908 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (interpreting line of business restrictions).
37. 47 U.S.C. §§ 251–52 (2000).
38. Id.
39. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-104, § 601(b)(1), 110 Stat. 143 (dealing with private rights of action). That
provision is not codified in the United States Code, except in the notes to 47 U.S.C. § 152.
40. Amended Complaint at ¶ 64, Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp. (Twombly I), 313 F. Supp. 2d 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (No. 02
CIV. 10220).
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combination or conspiracy to prevent competitive entry in their respective local telephone
and/or high speed internet services markets and have agreed not to compete with one
another and otherwise allocated customers and markets to one another.41
The gist of these allegations is as follows: the ILECs have conspired together to block any
CLEC from entering any of their respective territories.42 Its second allegation is that all the
defendants have agreed not to enter into each other’s territory as CLECs, in order to preserve
each other’s monopoly, and to signal to potential CLEC entrants that it would be unwise for them
to try to break up the ILEC monopoly position anywhere in the system.43 The alleged conspiracy
is said to have started in February, 1996 with the passage of the 1996 Act. The plaintiff class,
however, alleged no direct evidence of agreement, save arguably one isolated public comment six
years later, but pointed instead to public, inherently innocent facts such as their contiguous
territory and the clear advantage that each side is said to gain from having as little competition as
possible.44
In one sense, it seems clear that these allegations meet the requirements of Rule 8 insofar as
they put the defendant on notice of the nature of the claim and the time and place of the
challenged conduct. But at the same time the thinness of the evidence led Judge Lynch in the
District Court to grant the motion to dismiss on the ground that these bare-bones allegations
contained no specifics as to when the conspiracy was formed, or how it operated, even under the
liberal pleading rules of Rule 8.45 In so doing, the District Court was sensitive to the dangers of
inferring conspiracy from parallel conduct.
This inquiry [into parallel behavior] is admittedly difficult to distinguish from the factual
analysis that is more appropriate to summary judgment, as is evidenced by the fact that
cases involving motions to dismiss often cite summary judgment cases in support of their
conclusions that plaintiffs have not alleged sufficient facts.46
It then held that the plaintiff “must allege facts to support claims of conspiracy, even in light
of Rule 8.”47 The fact requirement that had been written out of Rule 8 was in effect read back in.
That decision was in turn reversed unanimously in the Second Circuit, yet not on the ground
that all questions of fact necessarily had to be raised only at the summary judgment stage. Rather,
one circuit court too thought that it was proper for questions of fact to creep back in at the motion
to dismiss stage, but changed the standard by which that was to be judged, going to a minimalist
standard such that “[t]he factual predicate that is pleaded does need to include conspiracy among
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. ¶ 51.
Id. ¶ 50.
Id. ¶¶ 40–41.
Twombly I, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 178.
Id. at 187–89.
Id. at 182.
Id. at 181.
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the realm of plausible possibilities.”48 The Second Circuit did not rule out the possibility that a
summary judgment motion could have proved relevant, after discovery.49 Nonetheless, Judge
Sack, writing in the Second Circuit, was far from confident that he had done the right thing, given
the uncertain state of the law, for he wrote:
We are mindful that a balance is being struck here, that on one side of that balance is the
sometimes colossal expense of undergoing discovery, that such costs themselves likely
lead defendants to pay plaintiffs to settle what would ultimately be shown to be meritless
claims, that the success of such meritless claims encourages others to be brought, and that
the overall result may well be a burden on the courts and a deleterious effect on the manner
in which and efficiency with which business is conducted. If that balance is to be recalibrated, however, it is Congress or the Supreme Court that must do so.50
The Supreme Court, of course, accepted this invitation. Its opinion, as noted, spent a good deal
of time addressing the potential abuses of discovery. But those observations were in the nature of
asides, for they did not represent the holding of the case, which went off on highly formalist
grounds and ended up with this proposition:
We do not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Because the plaintiffs here have not nudged their
claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be dismissed.51
There are multiple doctrinal grounds on which this decision can be criticized. The most
obvious of these is that the level of pleading specificity in Twombly III is scarcely distinguishable
from those which were adopted in the examples given in the Federal Rules. Under the regnant
standard of notice pleading, the defendants knew the time and place of all the charges against
them, and had some notice of the nature of the antitrust claim. If the question were only whether
this information could prepare them for the discovery that normally followed, the answer is of
course an unequivocal yes. Second, the ostensible distinction between “conceivable” to
“plausible” looks to be fuzzy at birth, and bears no particular relationship to any of the specific
language that is found in Rule 8. Surely, a horizontal arrangement to restrict entry or divide
territories has to count as plausible if the only question that were asked is whether the kind of
conduct charged is the kind of conduct that happens. I see nothing in the tortured application of
words like these which explains why this decision is right. The truth of the matter, quite simply, is
that the Supreme Court looked over the allegations in the complaint, thought of all the reasons
why they did not make any sense in the context of this regulated industry, and then refused to
48.
49.
50.
51.

Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp. (Twombly II), 425 F.3d 99, 111 (2d Cir. 2005).
Id. at 114.
Id. at 117.
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly (Twombly III), 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007).
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allow discovery to go forward because it had no confidence that thousands of hours of work
would dredge up any new information that would alter its priors.
In making this analysis, it becomes critical for the court to see the interconnection between
Twombly III, and the most important case of when and why summary judgment, after discovery,
is granted in antitrust cases. On this matter the key test for summary judgment motions was
articulated in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.52:
To survive a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict, a plaintiff seeking
damages for a violation of § 1 [of the Sherman Act] must present evidence “that tends to
exclude the possibility” that the alleged conspirators acted independently. Respondents in
this case, in other words, must show that the inference of conspiracy is reasonable in light
of the competing inferences of independent action or collusive action that could not have
harmed respondents.53
As stated, this test requires the plaintiff to present evidence “that tends to exclude”—not
“necessarily exclude”—the possibility of lawful conduct. In stating this test for summary
judgment, the Court in Matsushita extended its role beyond the simple question of whether
certain basic facts were either true or false. The appropriate analogy is a decision of a judge to
grant a defendant a summary judgment in a negligence case, not because some basic fact was true
or false, but because the sum of facts that were alleged could not on any reasonable interpretation
be said to “amount to” the negligence that is required in cases of this sort.54 These intermediate or
mixed propositions of fact and law are ones in which the judge has to make a considered
judgment about how the evidence fits together against some kind of general theory. The issue is
one on which there has been a lot of skepticism,55 much of which contributed to the adoption of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. I think that these worries are overwrought.56 To be sure, the
hybrid nature of the question means that summary judgment is not the ideal vehicle for doing this,
but then neither is a judgment as a matter of law, which also requires a court to make the same
kind of inferential calculation. Be that as it may, no one doubts that this inferential process from
basic facts to ultimate facts is a proper function for review, and it was just that assignment that
the Court undertook in Matsushita.57 There the plaintiffs did not allege the usual form of price52. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
53. Id. at 588.
54. See, e.g., Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66 (1927) (holding that a question may be withheld from a jury
when a clear standard of conduct has been determined by the courts); Pokora v. Wabash Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 98 (1934) (holding that
jury should be able to judge whether defendant was negligent, even if there was already a default standard); Metropolitan Railway.
Co. v. Jackson, (1877) 3 App. Cas. 193, 197 (U.K.) (“The Judge has to say whether any facts have been established by evidence from
which negligence may be reasonably inferred; the jurors have to say whether, from those facts, when submitted to them, negligence
ought to be inferred.”).
55. See Cook, Statements of Fact in Pleading Under the Codes, 21 COLUM. L. REV. 416, 417 (1921) (“[T]here is no logical
distinction between statements which are grouped by the courts under the phrases ‘statements of fact’ and ‘conclusions of law.’”).
56. FED. R. CIV. P. 50.
57. I have long been partial to the distinction, see, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Pleadings and Presumptions, 40 U. CHI. L. REV.
556, 563–64 (1973). For general discussion, see James et al., supra note 3, §§ 2.1–2.2.
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fixing, whereby the defendants obtain an immediate gain from high prices. Rather, they alleged a
predation case in which the defendants sought to lower prices today in order to reap higher profits
tomorrow.58 But the pitfalls of those allegations were explored in great depth at the summary
judgment stage. In this setting, the Court stressed that the lower prices that were charged by the
defendants, unaccompanied by other evidence, did not tend to exclude the possibility of lawful
competition, since firms in an industry always have an economic incentive to lower their prices if
they think that they can thereby gain market share. In order to make good on this challenge,
Matsushita and its progeny have required plaintiffs to introduce some “plus factors” to pick out
those cases that survive a motion for summary judgment from those that do not. A plus factor is
any form of evidence that tends to exclude the possibility that individuals work independently.59
It could, for example, be in ordinary price-fixing cases evidence that representatives of the
defendant all converged on some out of the way location for a secret meeting; or it could be an
econometric study which indicated that the prices in an industry took an unexpected jolt upward
that could not be explained by any unilateral decisions of firms within the industry to reduce their
own individual capacity in the face of a supply overhang in the market.
The conceptual challenge in Twombly III is whether the tend-to-exclude standard can be
carried over from the summary judgment stage to the earlier motion to dismiss stage under Rule 8
for exactly the same reason: the basic facts alleged in the complaint cannot amount to a credible
case of the ultimate fact of an unlawful territorial division. In tackling that question, it is
instructive to look at the extent to which information gained in the exhaustive discovery process
in Matsushita influenced the analysis of the Supreme Court. The short and decisive answer to that
question is: not at all. Although the Court reports that reams of information were collected, at no
point did its overall analysis cite to or rely on any of the material that was collected in
discovery.60 Indeed, the only argument that the plaintiff mentioned to indicate a conspiracy to
depress prices was that the defendants had, with the blessing of the Japanese government, entered
into a cartel to raise prices in Japan, which hardly goes to show that they would collude in order
to enter into a money-losing venture in the United States.61 Yet all that information was well
58. Epstein, supra note 57, at 577–78.
59. On plus factors, see, e.g., Apex Oil Co. v. DiMauro, 822 F.2d 246, 253–54 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 977 (1987).
60. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 576 (1986). Justice Powell leads off his opinion
explaining:
Stating the facts of this case is a daunting task. The opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit runs to 69 pages; the
primary opinion of the District Court is more than three times as long. In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust
Litigation, 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev’ing 513 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D. Pa. 1981). Two respected District Judges each have
authored a number of opinions in this case; the published ones alone would fill an entire volume of the Federal Supplement.
In addition, the parties have filed a 40-volume appendix in this Court that is said to contain the essence of the evidence on
which the District Court and the Court of Appeals based their respective decisions.
Id.
61. Id. at 583.
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known before the discovery process began. Instead the Court relied heavily on the generic
critiques of the success of predation tactics more generally, none of which depended on the
specifics found in this particular record.62
On this point there had been a vital division of opinion in the courts below. Before it was
reversed, the District Court had been prepared to take the plunge in order to make some factual
review of the case to see just how far the plaintiffs’ allegations took the case toward the ultimate
question of market division. “While the Second Circuit’s case law on parallel conduct
conspiracies has developed mainly in the context of summary judgment, district courts have
required that plaintiffs allege plus factors in order to withstand motions to dismiss as well.”63 The
Second Circuit did not disagree with that assumption:
We acknowledge that district courts have occasionally elided the distinction between the
standard applicable to Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 56 motions on the basis of a well-founded
concern that to do otherwise would be to condemn defendants to potentially limitless
“fishing expeditions”— discovery pursued just “in case anything turns up”—in hopes,
perhaps, of a favorable settlement in any event.64
Nonetheless, it refused to allow the blurring of the older pleading lines.65 The Supreme Court
clearly was influenced by the District Court, and cited its opinion on matters of evidence at
several key points. Yet it did not make the leap to ask this one question: what, if anything, could
be gained by going through discovery in this case? A fuller analysis of the various plus factors
shows why Twombly III should be framed as a mini-summary judgment case, conducted at the
close of the pleadings, and not as a pointless verbal disquisition on the contested meanings of
“plausible” and “conceivable.”
III. A DECISION THEORETICAL APPROACH
In grappling with this issue, it is useful to think of it as a decision theory question.66 Once a
complaint is filed, a district court must make some decision as to whether to stop the case or
allow it to go forward. On that issue, the Second Circuit, with its stress on “fair notice” of the
claim, in effect allowed discovery to commence in the absence of evidence of any particulars.
After all, the defendants have some notice of what to expect from a claim that states baldly: “All
defendants in the telephone industry have divided territories and fixed prices since February 8,
1996.” A more responsible approach, which seeks to both give notice and weed out groundless
62. Id. at 588–94. All the relevant factual information in this case comes from the various complaints. See, e.g., id. at 591 nn.13
& 14.
63. Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp. (Twombly I), 313 F. Supp. 2d 174, 179–80 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (citing Kramer v. PollockKrasner Found., 890 F. Supp. 250, 255–56 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), and Levitch v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 495 F. Supp. 649,
675 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)).
64. Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp. (Twombly II), 425 F.3d 99, 115 (2d Cir. 2005) (citations omitted).
65. Id. at 111 n.5.
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claims, also requires the procedural system to make some critical assessment of the costs and
benefits of stopping litigation at the pleading stage, and for any reason, relative to those of going
forward with discovery. On this matter, standard expected utility calculations suggest that
litigation should be allowed to go forward only when the likelihood of a positive case is high
enough to justify what both the Court of Appeals (which allowed the case to go forward) and the
Supreme Court (which did not) recognized as the enormous costs of discovery in class action
antitrust suits.
I think that one useful line for approaching this question works as follows: in those cases in
which the plaintiff has alleged only public sources for making out its claim of collusion, the
defendant should be able to avoid discovery and obtain a judgment on the pleadings by using the
same documents or the same kind of evidence to show that there is no genuine issue of fact left to
be decided on the case. In effect, therefore, discovery is appropriate only when there is some
evidence from some nonpublic source that justifies the greater expense of the discovery on the
case. Although the District Court in Twombly I did not articulate this test, nor even cite the
Matsushita decision that gives it some credibility, that is exactly what it did. Thus Judge Lynch
wrote: “When deciding such a motion [to dismiss on the pleadings], the Court may consider
documents attached to the complaint as exhibits or incorporated in it by reference, and such facts
as are suitable for judicial notice pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 201.”67 This logic was precisely
repeated by the Supreme Court, down to the reference to the Federal Rules of Evidence.68
Accordingly, both the Supreme Court and the District Court treated the defendant’s motion to
dismiss as though it set up a “mini-summary judgment” that is available solely when the plaintiff
relies on public information and its ostensible economic implications. In these circumstances the
defendant cannot defeat the claim for summary judgment prior to discovery if that defense relies
on private information that should be vetted through discovery. But so long as it relies on what
we may term evidence of “like kind” with what the plaintiff presents, the motion to dismiss, in
line with the undercurrent in the earlier precedents, should be squared with the emerging case law
in both antitrust law and beyond.
The point here has special relevance in Twombly III because the most likely outcome of any
discovery will be to leave this case exactly where it is at present. As is discussed in the next
section, all of the plaintiff class’s factual allegations are true (if vacuous). Sadly, exhaustive
discovery will not advance the substantive inquiry into illegal practices. After all, if these
statements are sufficient to support the inference of conspiracy, what kind of denials are so strong
66. Sven Ove Hansson, Decision Theory: A Brief Introduction, available at http://www. infra.kth.se/~soh/decisiontheory.pdf.
67. Twombly I, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 179.
68. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly (Twombly III), 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1972 (2007).
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to lead to the conclusion that the case presents no genuine issue of fact? Is this the kind of
boilerplate case that should survive a summary judgment motion? I see no real benefit in allowing
a case this weak to go forward to either discovery or trial on the strength of what, as becomes
evident in the next section, are such weak allegations.
The Second Circuit, and Justice Stevens’s dissent69 did not follow Judge Lynch’s lead, but
played a very different game: they allowed the plaintiff to rely on the public information to move
the case forward to the second stage, but did not allow the defendants to answer the factual
allegations of the case on the strength of “like kind” evidence.
A. The Twombly Particulars
The strength of Court’s approach is indicated by his examination of the case. As noted above,
the key allegation in the case is that the four defendants, each regional bell operating companies,
entered into a long-standing conspiracy to divide territories, which is a per se offense under § 1 of
the Sherman Act. On the question of law, I have no objection to the per se rule of illegality for
territorial division. But on the proof side, the plaintiff class relied only on three types of
circumstantial evidence.70 First, all the firms are in the same regulated industry and hence have
frequent opportunities on which they could choose to collude. Second, the territorial contiguity of
the various defendants makes it easy for each to enter each other’s territories. Third, a newspaper
story contained a quote by Richard Notebaert, an officer of one member of the alleged
conspiracy, observing that entering the territory of another bell company “might be a good way to
turn a quick dollar, but that doesn’t make it right.”71
The Federal Rules were of course not designed with these modern regulatory disputes in mind,
and notwithstanding their constant revision on matters of detail, the basic provisions at issue in
Twombly III have remained essentially unchanged since 1938. Judge Clark and the other drafters
of the Federal Rules did not fashion the standards for motions on the pleadings in light of the
complex institutional setting in which modern high-stakes litigation is brought. They did not have
any awareness that in markets such as telecommunications, firms are vulnerable to extensive and
constant government regulation. Once the plaintiff alleges the potential gain from staying out of
rival territories, the question is whether a trial court should put on its thinking cap to ask whether
the publicly available information militates against that possibility. On this question, it takes little
ingenuity to come up with the conclusion that Judge Lynch pointed the Supreme Court in the
right direction: none of these bits of evidence raises a reasonable inference of collusion when
69. Id. at 1985–86.
70. Twombly I, 313 F. Supp. 2d 174, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
71. See Amended Complaint at ¶ 42, Twombly I, 313 F. Supp. 2d 174 (No. 02 CIV. 10220) (quoting from Jon Van, Ameritech
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taken in light of other relevant public evidence. Look at each of the points in sequence.
B. The Opportunity to Collude
In most antitrust cases, there is good reason to allow a plaintiff some latitude on dealing with
matters of discovery, because conspirators know that their actions are subject to heavy penalities,
including criminal sanctions and treble damages, and therefore take major steps to conceal them.
As a general matter, therefore, Justice Stevens is sure to adhere to the general rule that “in
antitrust cases, where ‘the proof is largely in the hands of the alleged conspirators,’ . . . dismissals
prior to giving the plaintiff ample opportunity for discovery should be granted very sparingly.”72
But this situation is not just any conspiracy to which this general rule applies. The plaintiffs
allege that the defendant firms have extensive opportunities to collude with each other because
they are drawn together under a common scheme of regulation. The point of this supposed
evidence, which is easily available against all regulated industries, is that the proof of opportunity
to collude counts as a plus factor on the matter of collusion.73 Yet this notion of the opportunity to
collude represents only part of the story. It is equally evident, and thus subject to judicial notice,
that the telecommunications industry is a network industry in which all of its participants also
have at the very least a duty to interconnect with each other.74 It is quite inconceivable for any
firm to engage in the cooperative aspects of its private business unless it can speak to others on an
extensive and ongoing basis. This problem with network industries has long been recognized in
setting a qualification to the usual per se rule on horizontal contacts. Elsewhere, for example, the
Supreme Court has taken the position that communication among banks involved in checkclearing operations cannot give rise to an inference of collusion.75 What has to be shown is some
evidence of communication that sought to rig prices, divide territories or restrict output. Mere
communication in this context has no tendency to exclude legal forms of behavior.
Nor is this rule in the slightest bit irrational. The ability to communicate freely is, and has to
be, a regular part of the business for firms subject to constant administrative oversight by state
and federal commissions. The point has indeed already come up in connection with the
telecommunications industry in Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko,
LLP,76 where the Supreme Court reversed a Second Circuit decision on motion to dismiss an
antitrust claim (coincidentally written by Judge Sack). The Supreme Court reversed in large
measure because FCC oversight of the various carriers is so great as to render it likely that any
Customers Off Limits: Notebaert, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 31, 2002, at Business p.1.)
72. Twombly III, 127 S. Ct. at 1983 (quoting Hospital Building Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital, 425 U.S. 738 (1976)).
73. Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp. (Twombly II), 425 F.3d at 118.
74. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. §§ 251–52 (2000).
75. United States v. Citizens and S. Nat. Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 116 (1975).
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antitrust action would create endless mischief in areas that were under the direct oversight of the
FCC. Verizon was, to be sure, a peculiar variant on the typical federal preemption cases because
one federal system was thought to displace another. But the basic point carries over here. There is
little reason to think that mere opportunity to speak raises the risk of collusion when there is a
duty to speak that is subject to extensive independent regulatory control. The ostensible plus
factor of communication is thus fully neutralized when that fact is set into its larger, public
context.
C. The Conspiracy to Exclude Third Parties from all Local Territories
The plaintiff class also alleged that the defendants have conspired to keep all CLECs out of
their respective territories. Yet on this point, the Supreme Court was right to follow Judge
Lynch’s lead that, as a matter of sound economic theory, the evidence is worthless.77 Tested
against the “tend to exclude” standard of Matsushita, even at the pleadings stage, it is clear that
neither the plaintiff class in its complaint, nor the Second Circuit in its review of the complaint,
has supplied any answer to the devastating critique first penned by the District Court. The public
evidence used to buttress any inference of collusive behavior is negated by the public evidence
that each defendant has a powerful private incentive to keep all other companies out of its own
territory. Aggressive defensive behavior is therefore perfectly consistent with unilateral behavior.
Indeed, this conclusion is not one of mere possibility but of historical certainty. Vast portions
of the 1996 Telecommunications Act are directed toward the way in which the CLECs may take
advantage of the interconnection, resale and unbundled network rules in order to facilitate
competition. Once again direct administrative oversight, not antitrust law, offers the best way to
deal with that issue. The plaintiff class offers no explanation whatsoever as to why defendants
would ever risk any collusive behavior that carries with it exposure to treble damage actions
when each knows that all others labor under the same incentive to exclude for their own
territories. The plaintiff class offers the exotic theory that the ILECs have incentive to conspire
because if a CLEC succeeds in one territory there is no reason why it could not succeed in
another.78 But the complaint offers no explanation as to what forms of collective behavior would
even make sense. There is nothing in this record that detracts from the District Court’s initial
conclusion: “Given that each ILEC has reason to want to avoid dealing with CLECs and having
to ‘subsidize’ their entry into the market, each ILEC would attempt to keep CLECs out,
76. 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
77. Twombly III, 127 S. Ct. at 1971.
78. Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp. (Twombly I), 313 F. Supp. 2d 174, 184 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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regardless of the actions of the other ILECs.”79 Here is a perfect application of Matsushita’s “tend
to exclude” test based on public information only.
The plaintiff class does not fare any better in positing that it was in the separate interest of
each ILEC to enter as a CLEC the long-distance markets in the home territories of its rivals.80 The
first point to note is that any assessment on a motion to dismiss should take into account the risks
and costs associated with the alleged form of anti-competitive conduct. In the standard pricefixing case, it takes no fresh investment in new territories to make the decision to raise prices and
to lower output. The firm continues in the same market in much the same way as it has operated
before. The loss in revenues from reduced sales is more than offset by the increase in revenue
from higher prices. If the cartel unravels because other members cheat, then the firm can return to
the same competitive strategy that it had adopted prior to its participation in the illegal
conspiracy. There is little economic downside apart from getting caught in the usual price-fixing
arrangement, which is why the antitrust law intervenes. Under these circumstances, a trial judge
should show under Matsushita greater receptivity to a claim of this sort.
Twombly involves territories, not prices. On the factual side these cases are always more
complex because the antitrust law does not impose on any firm a duty to enter the territory of a
neighbor.81 Firms work in many regions and in many lines of business, and they are constantly
having to decide where to invest their capital and where not. As a matter of basic economic
theory, there are all sorts of reasons not to enter into a new territory that do not raise any hint of
collusion. In this regard it is instructive to compare these territorial decisions with the cases of
collusive predation that did not survive summary judgment in Matsushita and Brooke Group Ltd.
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp,82 to which we can now add as the third in the series the
predatory bidding decision in Weyerhaeuser v. Ross Simmons Hard-Wood.83
The customary account of predation rests on the sensible notion that it is highly unlikely that
any firm will invest (current) dollars to drive out other firms in the hopes that it will obtain some
monopoly position in the future during which time it will be able to recoup its losses in
(discounted) dollars.84 The first obstacle to predation is that the lower prices of the firm will
expand the demand for its products, thereby increasing its short-term losses. Yet in the future,
when the firm raises prices, it has no way to ward off new entrants into its markets, which could
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See Corner Pocket of Sioux Falls, Inc. v. Video Lottery Technologies, 123 F.3d 1107, 1112 (8th Cir. 1997) (“The operators’
practice of staying within their well-established service routes did not evidence an agreement to allocate territories.”).
82. 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
83. 127 S. Ct. 1069 (2007).
84. For the basic critique, see Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (1981),
as discussed in Matsushita, 475 U.S. 574, 588–98 (1986).
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include the firms that exited the market on a short-term basis during the attempted period of
predation. Absent truly extraordinary circumstances, there is no way that predation makes sense
for the single firm. And there is no way that predation makes sense for a group of firms who have
to share the losses among them. Indeed, if the group of firms did have a monopoly power, the
better strategy would generally be to raise prices, not to lower them. It was in this context that the
“tend to exclude” test showed its power on summary judgment.85 The parallel arguments work
with the predatory bidding cases. There are all sorts of reasons for firms to want to warehouse
inventory, including the desire to buffer themselves against anticipated higher prices. When they
do so, however, they take the risk that the market will turn against them, at which point they may
well have to sell off some portion of their stock at prices below its cost of acquisition, to which
must be added the interim carrying costs. In addition, it is hard to see how these excessive
accumulations could lead to predation unless the defendant eventually sold its paper products at
less than cost, as in the typical predation cases. Once again the rule in Weyerhaeuser is not one of
per se legality, but it is not easy to think of most ordinary markets (that is those with multiple
players, standard goods and long time horizons) in which this ostensible strategy for driving out
rivals could work. Here too in my view, the plaintiff has to come up with some striking
innovation early on in the course of litigation to make good on the case; otherwise there is no
more reason to hold off dismissal until the completion of discovery in these predatory bidding
cases than there is in the predatory pricing cases under Matsushita.
The factual setting in Twombly is still more complex by far than predation. The first point here
is that each ILEC knows in advance that its fellow ILECs are geared up to fight the new entrant.
Each ILEC also knows that entry into this market is not simply a matter of offering goods or
services for sale at some predetermined price. At the very least, long-term success requires
extensive capital investments in one or more locations to be made in the teeth of resistance from
the ILEC whose turf is invaded, and competition from many CLECs who seek to enter into the
same space. There are all sorts of independent reasons why a firm faced with many opportunities
and pitfalls would choose not to invade the territory of another firm. The point was made
repeatedly by the District Court, and it was echoed in the Supreme Court.86 But that analysis did
not register with Justice Stevens, nor with the Second Circuit, neither of which paid much
attention to the underlying economics.87
In response to these points, the plaintiff class has noted that the peculiar pricing system under
85. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly (Twombly III), 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964 (2007).
86. See, e.g., Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp. (Twombly I), 313 F. Supp. 2d 174, 185 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Twombly III, 127 S. Ct. at
1972–73.
87. Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp. (Twombly II), 425 F.3d 99, 118 (2d Cir. 2005); Twombly III, 127 S. Ct. at 1985–86 (2007).
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the 1996 Telecommunications Act allows any CLEC to purchase unbundled network elements at
favorable prices. It then insists, as a matter of basic economic theory, that there is no rational
reason why an ILEC would be prepared to leave money on the table, except through an illicit
agreement to divide territories.88 As a matter of economic theory, this argument is flatly wrong
once the full context, easily accessible from public sources, is taken into account. First, as the
plaintiff class itself alleged, all ILECs worked over time to keep new entrants from their territory.
That alone is a reason to be cautious about going in. In addition, the District Court did not note
what is also true economically: the extensive subsidies that were created under the 1996 Act were
not uniquely appropriable by any one firm. Any CLEC that entered the market would get the
same deal as any other. It follows that the entire statutory arrangement had two unwise economic
consequences. The first is that the greater the entry, the greater the cash bleed for the ILEC—
itself a good reason not to become a CLEC in another area. The second is that the ILEC turned
CLEC does not get a competitive advantage over any other CLEC, all of which are entitled to the
same preferential treatment. Competition dissipates the subsidy.
In addition, no ILEC is able to garner any special gains by taking on the role of a CLEC
outside its home territory. The District Court correctly saw that no ILEC could use the dominance
in its own territory to gain some cost advantage when it competed elsewhere. “Since being a
CLEC is a different business than being an ILEC, expanding into a new area is not simply a
question of expanding one’s infrastructure, or using the existing infrastructure to provide the
same services in a new location.”89 In addition, no ILEC could even start long-distance service in
its home territory until it met a check list of conditions (pertaining to showing competitive
conditions in its own territory).90 It is also worth noting that any subsidy would be competed
away by other CLECs.91 The entire situation during the relevant period created a perfect storm for
telecommunications. The ILECs were bled by immense subsidies from which the CLECs did not
prosper. It takes little imagination to find independent reasons why no ILEC would undertake this
venture. Any analysis of the situation from publicly available information thus shows that the
plaintiff class has advanced no reason that tends to exclude independent explanations for the
conduct of each named ILEC.
88. Twombly I, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 184; Twombly III, 127 S. Ct. at 1962–63.
89. Twombly I, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 186.
90. 47 U.S.C. §§ 271–72 (2000).
91. For discussion, see Richard A. Epstein, Takings, Commons, and Associations: Why the Telecommunications Act of 1996
Misfired, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 315, 340 (2005).
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D. The Notebaert Newspaper Interview
The next additional fact offered by the plaintiffs to explain why Twombly was not just a case
of innocent parallel conduct was an interview that Mr. Notebaert, as President of Qwest, gave to
the Chicago Tribune. The plaintiff class seized in its pleadings on one indiscreet sentence from
that interview—that an ILEC’s entry into another territory “might be a good way to turn a quick
dollar, but that doesn’t make it right”—to carry the burden of an entire case. First, territorial
agreements, like price-fixing arrangements, are done in secret, so that it defies common sense to
think that any participant would announce its illegal behavior to a newspaper reporter. Second,
the statement does not identify who the parties of any supposed conspiracy are, when they got
together, or how long the conspiracy lasted. One remark made in 2002 does not tend to show
behavior that was alleged to take place some six years before. Third, any shred of conspiracy
theory is rebutted by other quotations from the same document—public information of which the
plaintiff class surely had notice.92 Mr. Notebaert rightly notes that the entire pricing structure for
unbundled network elements was “nuts,” and that it was not sustainable, which it wasn’t. Thus in
speaking of the resale of UNEs, Mr. Notebaert commented, “ I don’t think it’s a sustainable
economic model. . . . It’s just a nuts pricing model.”93
Justice Stevens took issue with this view of the world, and thought that discovery would be
appropriate to explore exactly what else Notebaert had said at that interview that had not made it
into the story, which might reveal some information that placed the entire episode in a more
sinister light. “One possible (indeed plausible) inference is that he meant that while it would be in
his company’s economic self-interest to compete with its brethren, he had agreed with his
competitors not to do so.”94 What this analysis fails to do is to play the game out one more level.
Suppose that this deposition takes place, and Notebaert said that he did not refer to any hidden
conspiracy. At this point, the evidence does not change, but the question becomes what should be
done once the defendant moves for a summary judgment. If in fact the initial inference was
plausible, then Notebaert’s denial does not put the matter to rest but raises an issue of credibility
that has to be faced head on—before a jury. It is again the same story as before. Discovery cannot
conclusively resolve the matter, so the case has to go before a jury, at which point the pressure for
settling even worthless claims becomes overwhelming. No large company can reduce the risk of
an adverse verdict by more than eighty percent, which when trebled yields sixty percent of a very
large supposed figure for actual damages. The invocation of the standard model of the Federal
92. See Twombly III, 127 S. Ct. at 1972 n.13 (2007); Twombly II, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 188–89 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
93. Jon Van, Ameritech Customers Off Limits: Notebaert, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 31, 2002, at Business p. 1.
94. Twombly III, 127 S. Ct. at 1981.
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Rules thus authorizes large expenditures in order to increase the likelihood of an erroneous
verdict based on dubious inferences for admitted facts.
Indeed, in this context, Notebaert was proved correct by the course of events. The entire
pricing model that he rightly deprecated was thrown out shortly after his remarks by the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia on the grounds that it did not identify the circumstances in
which the CLEC was entitled as of right to purchase a UNE at below market prices.95 Thus
United States Telecom Association v. F.C.C. (USTA I),96 invalidated a first such effort that
previous May, and United States Telecom Association v. F.C.C. (USTA II),97 ended the epic
process less than two years later in March, 2004. Notebaert’s full comments in this article are
consistent with the view that he thought that the entire rate structure was sufficiently mispriced
and transient that it would be unwise, especially for a company that had lost $219 million, to try
to reestablish its financial position by going against stronger ILECs in their home turf. And
surely, it has to make sense, even at the pleading stage, to read the entire article, not just some
fraction of it.
E. Calls for Congressional Investigation
Finally, it seems odd to place any weight on the calls that various members of Congress make
for investigations of the ILECs for leaving money on the table.98 These obvious political gestures
are simple conclusions by individual politicians who have their own complex agendas. In and of
themselves, they offer no new private information that would allow for a finding that such a
combination was sensible enough to seduce any ILEC to participate. To afford these propositions,
any weight is to invite well-connected lawyers to implore their political allies in Congress to call
hearings in order to gin up some record of antitrust misfeasance. The safe rule in these cases is to
disregard all political statements, except to the extent that they are subject to independent
verification, but not one need rely on this general proposition, because public information is
available which shows unmistakably that the Department of Justice, with its vast power to
investigate all forms of collusive behavior, thought that there was no merit to these allegations.99
The point here has additional salience once it is recalled that in large antitrust cases pre-trial
discovery is not the only means available for the plaintiff to gather information that could lead to
filing a successful suit. Thus, it is common for private antitrust suits to piggy-back on government
95. See 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3), (d)(2)(A)–(B) (1997).
96. 290 F.3d 415 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
97. 359 F.3d 554 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
98. See, e.g., Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp. (Twombly I), 313 F. Supp. 2d at 178 (referencing statements of Congressman John
Conyers).
99. Antitrust Enforcement Agencies—The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice and the Bureau of Competition of the
Federal Trade Commission: Hearing Before the Task Force on Antitrust of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong., 1st Sess.
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investments that establish some form of price-fixing so private plaintiffs typically have to deal
only with the damage portion of the cases. Furthermore, in many regulated industries, such as
securities or telecommunications, all sorts of regulatory proceedings that can sniff out signs of
antitrust violations. Indeed, one reason why the Supreme Court was surely correct in its Credit
Suisse Securities (USA) v. Billing100 decision this past term was that the SEC has all sorts of ways
to superintend the operation of underwriting firms, making it highly unlikely that the addition of a
private antitrust lawsuit will improve overall enforcement. Put otherwise, in Twombly, we are not
faced with a situation where the plaintiff class seeks to maintain a law suit in the face of some
mysterious price movements that are not easily explained by competition pressures. Rather, the
question here is, given all that we know about the background logic of the case, and the results of
the DOJ investigation, should we incur the real potential abuses from what promises to be very
small gains? In other cases, it may well be that the proposals of the dissenting justices for staged
discovery could prove correct, even if difficult to administer. But in this case, the prospecting
looks like it has no chance of striking gold.
In sum, the Supreme Court was right to follow the District Court in dismissing the plaintiff
class at the pleading stage.101 One could assume that all the plaintiff class’s public evidence was
true, and still be unable to draw any sound inference of a conspiracy, given that a full account of
all public information negates an inference that the evidence presented tended to exclude any
form of legal conduct. The Matsushita standard, which was crafted in the context of summary
judgment, easily carries over to the pleading stage given that all the plaintiff class’s
circumstantial evidence proves worthless when placed in context. At no time, moreover, have the
plaintiffs offered any direct evidence on conspiracy, so that the entire case should be thrown out
for the failure to mount any kind, let alone any plausible kind, of proof. Proceeding to summary
judgment requires an immense expenditure of resources, but promises to supply no new
information that improves decisionmaking in this case.
E. Circuit Conflicts
The Supreme Court was right in Twombly III for yet another reason: it helped overcome the
strongly different approaches to summary judgment that have emerged in the circuit courts. The
last time that the Supreme Court took a look at the summary judgment standards was arguably
fourteen years ago in Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,102 which itself
77, 79 (July 24, 2003) (testimony of Assistant Attorney General R. Hewitt Pate).
100. 127 S. Ct. 2383 (2007).
101. Twombly I, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 180–81.
102. 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
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only applied the basic orientation previously set out in Matsushita103 and the subsequent case
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc.104 which only raised issues of the legality
of public contractual practices. In the years after these cases, the lower courts have diverged
among themselves in setting the standard by which cases could be dismissed both on the
pleadings before discovery has been undertaken and on summary judgment after discovery. Some
circuits have been too strict in their requirements for circumstantial evidence,105 while others have
been far too lax.106 The differential standard leads to skewed results as plaintiffs, who enjoy a first
mover advantage, systematically bring their cases in those circuits that are most willing to allow
cases to go to trial. This long-standing confusion leads to certain unfortunate dynamic
consequences that undermine the effectiveness of the antitrust laws. The plaintiffs’ lawyers will
in many cases be able to fashion their complaint to avoid those circuits (like the Eighth) which
have artificially high standards for summary judgment. Yet they will flock to other circuits, like
the Second, whose standards for judgment on the pleadings and summary judgment are far too
permissive.
The effects of these two errors are therefore not identical, as the former will bite only in those
cases where antitrust plaintiffs have no choice of circuit, while the latter will bite in nationwide
suits where the plaintiffs have the choice of venue. This form of strategic behavior suggests that
any circuit which is an outlier on the plaintiff side will have disproportionate influence over the
entire process. Most antitrust cases involve charges of conduct that takes place on a nationwide
scale so that jurisdiction can be laid in the district courts of any federal circuit. Skilled plaintiffs’
lawyers armed with a potent first mover advantage can pick the circuits most favorable to their
position. It follows therefore that those circuits in which the bar for summary judgment is set too
high will see few if any cases brought within them, while those circuits, like the Second, which
set the bar too low will attract numerous cases, so the two kinds of error will not be of equal
severity. Setting the bar too high has minor social costs, chiefly from creating maldistribution of
work across the circuits. Setting the bar too low, even in one circuit, raises the direct prospect of
opening a set of floodgates that should be tightly fastened.
The structural problem lies not solely in the fact that the test of the Second Circuit is too lax. It
also lies in the use of standards that are too high. One instance (in which I was the losing counsel
for the plaintiffs) that shows this tendency is Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp. of
103. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
104. 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
105. Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp. of Saskatchewan, 203 F.3d 1028 (8th Cir. 2000); Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929
F.2d 604, (11th Cir. 1991); Russ v. Int’l Paper Co., 943 F.2d 589 (5th Cir. 1991).
106. Cornwell v. Electra Cent. Credit Union, 439 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that a plaintiff relying on circumstantial
evidence does not have to produce more or better evidence than one relying on direct evidence to withstand summary judgment); Todd
v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191 (2d Cir. 2001).

403-rae-twombly.doc

2007]

4/28/2008

Twombly Summary Judgment

27

Saskatchewan,107 in which the Eighth Circuit sustained a summary judgment against the plaintiffs
who alleged a price-fixing conspiracy among the six major Canadian producers of potash.108 The
particular evidence presented in that case included much specific documentary evidence about
future price raises for all members of the group, correspondence and exchanges among high-level
officials of the various companies complaining about price movements and threatening
retaliation, and a detailed econometric study that controlled for unilateral changes in output in
order to show that sharp spikes in prices could only be attributable to coordinated action.109 One
piece of evidence in this case was a memo from the Canadian Potash Export (“Canpotex”), which
reads in full:
FYI Canadian potash producers have reached agreement with the United States
Department of Commerce and all dumping action has been suspended for minimum 5
years. It is rumoured that the USD per metric ton increase posted by Canadian producers in
1987 to cover possible tariff payments to the U.S. Govt will be refunded in full or part. In
the meantime new price lists are being issued on Monday Jan. 11 at: Standard Grade USD
80.00; Coarse Grade USD 84.00; Granular Grade USD 86.00.110
Canpotex is a cartel organized to sell Canadian potash for export on a joint basis. Its directors
are senior executives of the Canadian potash producers. It is precluded by law from involvement
in the sale of potash to the United States, and there is no valid reason for its members to discuss
the subject of American prices. Every one of the defendants had representatives at Canpotex
meetings. It would have been easy for them to retire to a separate room and set prices off the
record for the American market. In fact, these price increases were implemented by all Canadian
producers into the American market, just as stated in the memo. The evidence not only tends to
exclude the possibility of mere independent behavior, but it tends to establish collusion by direct
evidence. Nonetheless, the Eighth Circuit, over a powerful dissent,111 held that neither the memo,
nor the constant backbiting between the firms over the period of raised prices, nor the
econometric study, either alone or in combination, raised a triable issue of fact.112 The net effect
of this decision was, without exaggeration, to require a plaintiff to prove its case beyond a
reasonable doubt to a judge in order to have the opportunity to prove it by a preponderance of
evidence before a jury. That decision stands in notable contrast, for example, to the Seventh
Circuit’s decision in High Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) Antitrust Litigation,113 which quite
emphatically rejected the proposition that “if no single item of evidence presented by the plaintiff
107. 203 F.3d 1028 (8th Cir. 2000). For a justly negative assessment of the weak opinion, see Herbert Hovenkamp, THE
ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION, 134–35 (2005), which tracks the analysis in the text.
108. Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp. of Sask., 203 F.3d 1028, 1032.
109. Id. at 1033–39.
110. Id. at 1035 (emphasis added).
111. Id. at 1039.
112. Id. at 1033–34, 1038.
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points unequivocally to conspiracy, the evidence as a whole cannot defeat summary judgment,”114
only to allow the case to reach a jury on evidence that was far weaker than that in Blomkest, albeit
far stronger than the evidence produced in Twombly. These two cases are both summary
judgment cases, after discovery, which means that they raise the same issue as Twombly but at a
later stage of inquiry.
No matter what stage the litigation, the key issue is only whether the evidence presented up to
the time of the defendant’s motion has any tendency to support the allegations in question. In
most instances, the pleadings are a bad time to make that call. In Twombly, it was not. Both lower
courts that decided Twombly understood that the plaintiff was seeking to win on a hopeless
antitrust case. Fortunately, the Supreme Court followed Judge Lynch when it sustained the
motion to dismiss at the close of the pleading stage.

IV. CONCLUSION
Twombly is of course only one case. But the larger message, which covers the vast amount of
complex litigation that takes place daily in federal court, should also be clear. The current
provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were designed in an earlier era for litigation
that on average has been far simpler than litigation today. The Rules operated on an assumption
that the greater risks in civil litigation came from the premature dismissal of meritorious cases
brought by ordinary people of little means or sophistication. The large modern business dispute or
class action does not fit into that template at all, for both sides are represented by sophisticated
attorneys who are able to take strategic advantage of the various options given to them under the
law. In this environment, the balance of convenience has changed. Now there is a far greater peril
of allowing frivolous litigation to go on too long as well as a risk of cutting short meritorious
litigation. The cases on motions to dismiss and summary judgment are in shambles because weak
cases are allowed to trudge on through the system while stronger ones are knocked out. Some
calibration of the scales of error is needed to remedy this situation.
The basic logic of decision theory is that going forward in litigation has real costs that should
be justified only if there is some confidence that the investment in process improves the overall
decision-making procedures. In dealing with large suits against institutional defendants, the risk is
not only of a single action, but of copycat suits which raise the same issues in a slightly different
fashion in other courts or against other defendants. It is of course clear that government abuse is a
113. 295 F.3d 651 (7th Cir. 2002).
114. In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 655 (7th Cir. 2002).
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serious matter that cannot be lightly dismissed. So too, without question, cartels do present
serious risks, so these antitrust cases should normally be allowed to go forward. But in a world in
which context is key, a general proposition is not a uniform truth. Decisions like Matsushita,
Brooke, and Twombly III all deviate from the Federal Rules for the same reason. The facts that
are evident in the complaint are better explained in ways that tend to exclude the conspiracy in
question. At this point, allowing the case to go forward increases both the costs of error and the
costs of administration; a double loss.
Twombly III takes that logic one step further. There is no inherent reason why conspiracies to
divide territories should collapse of their own weight—at least in an unregulated market. But
once the full institutional setting is taken into account, the factual allegations don’t begin to
justify the futile discovery that would follow if the motion to dismiss were denied. There are two
kinds of error in all cases, and so long as the plaintiff relies solely on public evidence that is
refuted or explained away by the same type of evidence (often evidence in the same documents),
then the balance of error has clearly shifted. I do not believe that plaintiffs are entitled to make
blank charges devoid of all factual content just to gain access to the discovery system. That same
logic, in antitrust cases and beyond, should lead to a dismissal at the close of pleadings in any
case where the defendant has negated all inferences of culpability by using the same kinds of
public evidence that the plaintiff has used to establish a factual underpinning to the underlying
complaint. In one sense this particular understanding of the case is a change in degree and not one
in kind. Both Justice Stevens and the Second Circuit admitted that some “facts” had to be
pleaded, but thought that the plaintiff had met that burden. In cases where public facts do not
negate the thrust of the plaintiff’s case, there is every reason to follow the older rules, both in
antitrust cases and beyond. But when the full record at the time of the motion to dismiss does not
support any plausible factual inference of guilt, then it is time to invoke a mini-summary
judgment under the guise of a motion to dismiss.
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Professor Richard Epstein
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